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THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SUPREME 
LAW BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NEW 
ZEALAND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
Juliet Bull* 
The enactment of a supreme law Bill of Rights in New Zealand would have significant implications 
for the process of appointing judges. This article considers whether the present judicial 
appointments system should be retained were New Zealand to amend the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 to have supreme law status. It contends that the present appointments process is 
insufficiently transparent and offers too few checks and balances to safeguard the apolitical nature 
of appointments. Canada's experience after enacting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
is drawn upon to demonstrate the need for reform. After various options are considered, it is 
ultimately contended that the adoption of a supreme law Bill of Rights in New Zealand should be 
accompanied by the creation of a judicial appointments commission. 
I INTRODUCTION 
If New Zealand were to enact a supreme law Bill of Rights, giving judges the power to 
invalidate legislation that is inconsistent with fundamental rights and freedoms, the judiciary would 
become a more powerful branch of government with judges more prominently involved in political 
and policy disputes. This article examines whether the present system of appointing judges would 
remain fit for purpose – whether it is sufficiently transparent and democratic, and whether it would 
effectively safeguard judicial independence – were judges to take on this new and wider power.  
After considering how the role of judges would be altered by a supreme law Bill of Rights and 
what is meant by the oft-stated charge that judicial appointments will subsequently become 
politicised, this article then examines New Zealand's present system of appointments. The integrity 
of key actors is shown to be the primary safeguard against improperly political appointments. 
Drawing on Canada's experience after the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter)1 
  
*  Submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. 
1  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, art 7 (pt 1 of the Constitution Act 1982, being sch B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK)). 
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was enacted, it is contended that the existing appointments system should not be retained if a 
supreme law Bill of Rights is adopted. The Canadian experience provides several insights as to how 
reform of judicial appointments should be undertaken. 
Given the conclusion that change is needed, the final parts of this article evaluate the advantages 
and disadvantages of various options for reform. This analysis illustrates tensions that exist between 
several of the goals that reform of judicial appointments seeks to achieve. Ultimately, if a supreme 
law Bill of Rights is to be enacted, it is contended that an appointments commission which 
recommends a shortlist of candidates from which the Attorney-General selects who to appoint 
should be adopted. 
II A SUPREME LAW BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NEW ZEALAND 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) has influenced both the law-making 
process, by requiring that the Attorney-General report to the House of Representatives on whether a 
Bill is inconsistent with the Act,2 and statutory interpretation, by mandating that judges interpret 
statutes in a manner consistent with the protected rights.3 Despite its substantial influence, the 
original proposal went much further with an entrenched Act of supreme law status,4 permitting 
courts to invalidate legislation inconsistent with the Act. Although this attracted opposition at the 
time, there remains a sense of unfinished business and the possibility that New Zealand will 
eventually amend the Act to have supreme law status. Sir Geoffrey Palmer referred to the 
"constitutional caravan" moving on in suggesting that the time may have come for this reform to 
occur.5  
This article does not address the desirability of that reform, a matter which has been the subject 
of extensive academic debate. Instead, it assumes that a supreme law Bill of Rights is to be adopted 
and addresses a collateral matter that has not received academic attention: the implications of a 
supreme law Bill of Rights for New Zealand's system of appointing judges. To assess this issue, it is 
assumed that NZBORA in its present form would be amended to have supreme law status. 
Therefore the same rights and freedoms as presently protected would be upheld as higher law.6 
  
2  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7. These reports can be found on the Ministry of Justice website 
<www.justice.govt.nz>. 
3  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6. For further discussion see JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law 
in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) at 332–383. 
4  See Geoffrey Palmer "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [1984–1985] I AJHR A6.  
5  Geoffrey Palmer "The Bill of Rights After Twenty-One Years: The New Zealand Constitutional Caravan 
Moves On?" (2013) 11 NZJPIL 257. 
6  There has been significant academic commentary on whether additional rights should be protected within 
the Act, but this is outside the scope of this article. See, for example, the argument of Butler and Butler on 
the protection of social and economic rights, property rights and the right to privacy: Andrew Butler and 
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A What Would Change? 
The fundamental change brought by a supreme law Bill of Rights is the ability of courts to strike 
down laws that are repugnant to the rights contained within it. In determining whether to invalidate 
legislation, courts would consider whether the breach of rights was "demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society".7 This section assesses the significance of that new power for New 
Zealand's judges.  
There are some reasons to think this reform would not significantly alter judges' powers. Judges 
are already generally bolder and more willing to develop the law than in the past.8 Moreover, the 
rights protected by NZBORA are generally procedural rather than substantive. This, Sir Kenneth 
Keith suggests, goes some way toward avoiding the difficulties associated with unconfined rights – 
like an equal protection clause – that give judges greater scope to second guess policy decisions of 
the executive and legislature.9 
Nonetheless, a supreme law Bill of Rights is still likely to have a substantial impact on the role 
of New Zealand's judges. Enactment of the Charter has had significant implications for the Canadian 
judiciary: former Chief Justice Antonio Lamer said "the Charter has changed our job 
descriptions",10 forcing judges to make what were formerly political decisions.11 Chief Justice 
Beverly McLachlin expressed similar sentiments, saying that the Charter forced courts "to grapple 
with a whole range of hitherto unlitigable issues, many of them involving social and moral questions 
of profound importance and difficulty".12 Examples of major Canadian Charter cases include 
striking down a reverse onus provision;13 striking down a provision criminalising abortion;14 and 
  
Petra Butler "Protecting Rights" in Caroline Morris, Jonathan Boston and Petra Butler (eds) Reconstituting 
the Constitution (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2011) 157. 
7  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4. 
8  Geoffrey Palmer "Judicial Selection and Accountability: Can the New Zealand System Survive" in BD Gray 
and RB McClintock (eds) Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 11 at 16–17. 
This is demonstrated, for example, through the interpretation of constitutional documents as living texts and 
developments in judicial review of administrative action.   
9  KJ Keith "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: Judicial Review versus Democracy" (1985) 11 NZULR 307 
especially at 315–316.  
10  James WStG Walker "Race," Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada (Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, Waterloo (ON), 1997) at 325. 
11  FL Morton "Judicial Recruitment and Selection" in FL Morton (ed) Law, Politics and the Judicial Process 
in Canada (3rd ed, University of Calgary Press, Calgary, 2002) 117 at 128. 
12  BM McLachlin "The Charter: A New Role for the Judiciary" (1991) 29 Alta L Rev 540 at 543.  
13  R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
14  R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30. 
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decisions on gay rights15 and euthanasia.16 It is foreseeable that cases could emerge on similarly 
prominent and controversial issues in New Zealand.  
Commentators recognise that a supreme law Bill of Rights might necessitate changes to the 
appointments system. For example, a Chen Palmer report for then Attorney-General Margaret 
Wilson said that, were New Zealand to adopt this reform, "a different approach to the role of the 
Executive in the appointment and removal of judges might be a necessary consideration as part of 
wider constitutional reform".17  
The issue is whether the present appointments system will remain fit for purpose once judges 
have new and significantly wider powers. Will the system enhance public confidence in the 
independence of the judiciary and judges' suitability to decide Bill of Rights cases? Is the process 
sufficiently transparent and inclusive so as to avoid the perception of a democratic deficit, a 
heightened risk given the transfer of power from Parliament to judges? One oft-stated concern is 
that a supreme law Bill of Rights increases the risk that governments will improperly appoint judges 
for political reasons, to ensure that the courts will uphold the government's values and not overturn 
its legislative achievements. The next section examines what is meant by the concern that 
appointments will be politicised.  
B Politicised Judicial Appointments 
The judiciary's independence is a fundamental element of the rule of law.18 While some 
mechanisms, like security of tenure and the prohibition on salary reductions, uphold judicial 
independence by protecting sitting judges from improper influence, this value must also be 
protected via the appointments process. As the Economist editorialised, "the independence of the 
judiciary depends on the way judges are selected".19 There is little literature examining precisely 
what is meant by the concept of "politicised judicial appointments". Some commentators treat the 
general increase in the power of the courts vis-à-vis the legislature and the perception of "activist 
  
15  Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493. 
16  Carter v Canada 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331. 
17  Chen Palmer & Partners "Memorandum to the Hon Margaret Wilson, Attorney-General: Judicial 
Administration Issues" (1 November 2002) at [55].  
18  Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2014) at 797.  
19  "Who Judges the Judges?" The Economist (London, 15 November 2003) at 11, as cited in Peter McCormick 
"Selecting the Supremes: The Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court of Canada" (2005) 7 J App Prac 
& Process 1 at 28. Also see Martin L Friedland "Appointment, discipline and removal of judges in Canada" 
in HP Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 46 
at 51. 
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judges" as evidence of politicisation.20 However, the focus here is on accusations that judicial 
appointments – not the role of judges generally – may become politicised.  
It is clear that judicial appointments should not be made on the basis of a candidate's political 
affiliation or membership of a particular political party. Rewarding or punishing a candidate for this 
reason is undesirable.21 This issue is sidestepped to an extent in New Zealand where it would likely 
be considered inappropriate for a former Member of Parliament or prominent member of a political 
party to be appointed a judge. 
Concerns about politicisation go beyond party politics, but it is here that drawing clear lines 
about what should and should not be permissible becomes difficult. Judicial appointments will 
always possess some element of politics in its broadest sense. Sir Robin Cooke said that 
appointments by the executive are "inevitably political to a greater or lesser degree".22 Graham Gee 
similarly suggests it would be impossible to remove the political dimension from appointments 
given that the process shapes the courts' ability to hold political institutions to account.23 
When Palmer explained the characteristics he sought in judges as "forward-looking people of 
high intellectual ability, equipped with ample legal learning, experienced, practical, and able to 
bring essential human qualities to the administration of the law", he recognised that these factors 
may be perceived by some as political considerations.24 It is however impossible, and moreover 
undesirable, to attempt to remove these sorts of considerations from the appointments process. In 
contrast, an inappropriately political appointment would be based on a prospective judge's personal 
views on specific issues that may arise before the courts, or anticipation of how the candidate would 
decide particular cases. Drawing on an example from the United States, the "litmus test" purportedly 
adopted to check a candidate's position on abortion is an example of an inappropriately political 
enquiry into how a judge would approach a particular issue. 
There is a further need to avoid candidates who are driven by ideology. The decision maker's 
general sense about the extent the judge will defer to Parliament is broadly political, but also likely 
  
20  See for example Brian Galligan and Peter Russell "The Politicisation of the Judiciary in Australia and 
Canada" (1995) 67(2) The Australian Quarterly 85.  
21  See Kate Malleson "The New Judicial Appointments Commission in England and Wales: New Wine in 
New Bottles" in Kate Malleson and Peter H Russell (eds) Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: 
Critical Perspectives from around the World (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006) 39 at 41.  
22  Robin Cooke "Empowerment and Accountability: The Quest for Administrative Justice" (1992) 18 CLB 
1326 at 1331.  
23  Graham Gee "The Politics of Judicial Appointments in Canada" in Judicial Appointments: Balancing 
Independence, Accountability and Legitimacy (Judicial Appointments Commission, 2010) 99 at 99. 
24  Geoffrey Palmer Reform (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2013) at 302. For a similar perspective in 
the United Kingdom context see Jack Straw Aspects of Law Reform: An Insider's Perspective (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2013) at 57. 
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arises in the context of assessing the quality of his or her previous judgments and could not be 
removed from consideration. What must be avoided, however, are appointments based on a 
demonstrated track record of ideologically driven decisions. This record could be one of an unduly 
black letter and conservative approach to interpretation, systematic opposition to striking down laws 
in favour of extreme deference to Parliament, or a record of excessive activism and eagerness to find 
grounds on which laws can be invalidated. A candidate's record may be shown through their 
judgments or, in the case of new appointments to the bench, their conduct and writing while in 
practice.25  
In summary, a politicised appointment is one that takes into account party politics and a 
candidate's position on political issues and, more broadly, a decision that is made in anticipation of 
how the judge would decide particular cases before them. The system of appointments must guard 
against the government's ability to stack a court with ideologically driven candidates.  
III JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS IN NEW ZEALAND 
At present the Attorney-General is responsible for making judicial appointments. This part 
explains the process typically adopted by Attorneys-General and explores the strengths and 
weaknesses of this system.  
A Present System of Appointments 
Before the 1990s, New Zealand's appointments process was frequently criticised for lacking 
transparency. Described as "a highly discreet search process",26 it was "shrouded in secrecy and 
mystery".27 There were no published criteria for judicial office, expressions of interest were not 
called for, vacancies were not advertised, no interviews of candidates occurred and consultation 
processes were ad hoc.28  
Some members of the legal profession supported this highly secretive system. From this 
perspective, the position's prestige required that the office should seek out the best occupants, rather 
than would-be occupants seeking judicial office; advertising and calling for applications 
"diminish[ed] the status of the office and thus its attraction as the pinnacle of a legal career".29 This 
  
25  See Dyson Heydon "Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law" (2003) 47 Quadrant 9, a speech 
that was later referred to in jest as Heydon's "job application" because he was appointed shortly after its 
delivery to the High Court of Australia. For further discussion of this speech in the context of lobbying for 
appointment see David AR Williams "The Judicial Appointment Process" [2004] NZ L Rev 39 at 62. 
26  John McGrath "Appointing the Judiciary" [1998] NZLJ 314 at 316. 
27  Philip A Joseph "Appointment, discipline and removal of Judges in New Zealand" in HP Lee (ed) 
Judiciaries in Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 66 at 66. 
28  At 68. 
29  See McGrath, above n 26, at 316 for a discussion and critique of this perspective. 
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position, which enhances the perception that judicial appointments are insular and based on 
shoulder-tapping, has not prevailed. Instead, greater standardisation developed following a 1999 
review and since then the process has featured appointment criteria, a clarified consultation process 
and a system of calling for expressions of interest.30  
Despite increased standardisation, very few statutory provisions regulate judicial appointments. 
The Judicature Act 1908 provides that "Judges of the High Court shall be appointed by the 
Governor-General in the name and on behalf of her Majesty".31 Judges must have held a practising 
certificate as a barrister or solicitor for at least seven years,32 although most have had at least 15–20 
years of legal experience before their appointment.33 Shortlisted candidates must undertake not to 
resume legal practice upon retiring as a judge.34 
The Governor-General appoints judges on the advice of the Attorney-General. Although the 
procedure adopted by a particular Attorney-General is prescribed neither by statute nor regulation, 
successive Attorneys have adopted broadly similar processes.35 In 2013 Attorney-General Hon 
Christopher Finlayson MP published a protocol setting out procedures and criteria for High Court 
appointments, described below.36  
Prospective candidates may submit an expression of interest form, which is called for by public 
advertisement, or may be nominated during the consultation process. Candidates must provide a 
curriculum vitae and a declaration on issues like their health and financial position.37 The Judicial 
Appointments Unit, part of the Ministry of Justice, provides administrative assistance throughout 
  
30  Patrick McCabe "Appointing Judges" [2004] NZ L Rev 244 at 244.  
31  Judicature Act 1908, s 4(2).  
32  Judicature Act 1908, s 6. Also see District Courts Act 1947, s 5(3).   
33  Ministry of Justice Appointing Judges: A Judicial Appointments Commission for New Zealand? A Public 
Consultation Paper (April 2004) at 13.  
34  Joseph, above n 27, at 69. 
35  James Allan "Judicial Appointments in New Zealand: If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well it were 
done openly and directly" in Kate Malleson and Peter H Russell (eds) Appointing Judges in an Age of 
Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the World (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006) 
103 at 105. 
36  See Crown Law Office High Court judges appointment protocol (April 2013, updated April 2014). Other 
former Attorneys-General and Solicitors-General have summarised the processes adopted while they were 
in office. See from former Attorneys-General: Palmer, above n 8, at 41–52; Paul East "A Judicial 
Commission" [1995] NZLJ 189 at 189–190; and Margaret Wilson "Appointing Judges the New Zealand 
Way" (2014) 21 Wai L Rev 41 at 46–47. See from former Solicitors-General: McGrath, above n 26, at 314–
315; and Terence Arnold, Solicitor-General "Judicial Appointments" (Speech to the New Zealand Bar 
Association Conference, Wellington, 21 August 2003) at 2–3.  
37  Crown Law Office, above n 36, at Appendix 2. 
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the process and holds a confidential database containing the names of those who have expressed 
interest and are qualified for appointment.38 
The Solicitor-General seeks comment on the candidates from a range of people and 
organisations and asks the Chief Justice, President of the Court of Appeal and the Chief High Court 
Judge to give all prospective candidates a rating.39 A long-list is created and presented to the 
Attorney-General containing those considered suitable for immediate appointment, those possibly 
suitable in two to three years and those in neither category. 
For an upcoming vacancy, the Attorney-General, after completing the consultation he or she 
believes necessary and with the agreement of the Chief Justice, will determine a shortlist of no more 
than three names from which interviews conducted by the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General 
may occur.40 The Attorney-General will select one candidate from the shortlist, mention the 
appointment in Cabinet and formally advise the Governor-General to make the appointment.41 The 
shortlisting process is repeated for each upcoming High Court vacancy or appointment. 
District Court appointments follow a similar process. The most significant difference is that a 
panel conducts interviews of shortlisted candidates.42 This panel consults with the Solicitor-General 
and the President of the Law Society before making its recommendation to the Attorney-General.43 
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court appointments typically occur through judicial promotion and 
although appointment directly from the profession is permitted for both courts,44 this rarely occurs 
for Court of Appeal appointments and has never occurred for the Supreme Court.45 Again there is 
little direction from legislation.  
There are two primary exceptions to the process outlined above. The Minister of Māori Affairs 
recommends the appointment of judges to the Māori Land Court46 and the Prime Minister 
  
38  Joseph, above n 27, at 68. 
39  Crown Law Office, above n 36, at 4–5.  
40  Crown Law Office, above n 36, at 5.  
41  See ss 4(2) and 57(2) of the Judicature Act 1908 and s 17 of the Supreme Court Act 2003. 
42  Ministry of Justice Judicial Appointments: Office of the District Court Judge (August 2012) at 6. The panel 
comprises the Chief District Court Judge, the relevant Head of Bench, the Executive Judge for the region 
and a representative of the Ministry of Justice. 
43  At 6.  
44  Judicature Act 1908, s 57; and Supreme Court Act 2003, s 20. 
45  Joseph, above n 27, at 69. 
46  See Te Ture Whenua Māori Act (Māori Land Act) 1993, s 7(2A), which requires that Māori Land Court 
judges have knowledge of te reo Māori, tikanga Māori and the Treaty of Waitangi. 
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recommends the appointment of the Chief Justice. The Law Commission recently expressed 
approval of this exception,47 and the Prime Minister's role is to be codified.48  
B Advantages and Disadvantages 
In assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the present system of appointments, this 
section pays particular attention to its ability to safeguard political neutrality in appointments. This 
is because the primary disadvantages of the present system are the lack of transparency and few 
formal checks and balances that limit the Attorney-General's exercise of discretion. 
Widespread consultation is a key feature of the present process. Those consulted include senior 
judges (the Chief Justice, President of the Court of Appeal and Chief High Court Judge); 
organisations representative of lawyers (including the Presidents of the Law Society and Bar 
Association, and possibly the Māori Law Society and women lawyers' associations); senior 
politicians (including the Ministers of Justice, Women's Affairs and Māori Affairs, and possibly the 
Justice and Electoral Select Committee chairperson and shadow Attorney-General) and others like 
the President of the Law Commission.49 This consultation seeks to gather a diverse group of 
candidates and particularly to find individuals whose career and background are not reflected in the 
present judiciary.50 Further consultation with a smaller group occurs as the Solicitor-General seeks 
comment on prospective candidates. The involvement of the shadow Attorney-General, a recently 
emerging practice, has been described as a "symbolic endorsement of the apolitical nature of 
appointments".51 However, the protocol produced by Mr Finlayson suggests that the shadow 
Attorney-General "may" be consulted when nominations are sought, suggesting this practice is not 
firmly established.52  
An important feature of this process is the high level of judicial involvement. The most recent 
protocol outlined by Mr Finlayson suggests the Chief Justice has a veto power because the shortlist 
is created "with the agreement of the Chief Justice".53 Commentators including Palmer have been 
critical of appointments processes that gives judges a veto power.54 Then Solicitor-General John 
  
47   Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New Courts Act (NZLC R126, 2012) at 
recommendation 13. Also see [5.11].  
48  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178-2), cl 100. 
49  Crown Law Office, above n 36, at 6. Also see McGrath, above n 26, at 314; and Arnold, above n 36, at 3. 
50  See East, above n 36, at 191; and McGrath, above n 26, at 314.  
51  Joseph, above n 27, at 68. 
52  Crown Law Office, above n 36, at 6. 
53  Crown Law Office, above n 36, at 5. 
54  Palmer, above n 8, at 43.  
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McGrath QC's comment that the judiciary's role is consultative and that its input does not tightly 
restrict who may be chosen suggests that a judicial veto is not a firmly established rule.55 This 
inconsistency demonstrates one of the system's drawbacks; the absence of a firm statutory footing 
permits ad hoc procedures that lack transparency, notwithstanding efforts to standardise the process.  
Judicial influence is counterbalanced by the Attorney-General having the final say over 
appointments, which is seen as having two benefits. First, giving the Attorney-General discretion is 
appropriate because he or she has the democratic mandate as a member of a government that enjoys 
Parliament's support; and secondly, this discretion is said to have encouraged the appointment of 
lawyers with diverse backgrounds in the law.56 
The principal disadvantage of this system is the lack of formal safeguards to limit the Attorney-
General's exercise of discretion. Two main bulwarks protect the political neutrality of appointments: 
first, the conventions that govern the Attorney-General's decision making; and secondly, the fact 
that political pressures hold the Attorney-General accountable. The strength of these protections is 
evaluated in the following section. The arguments here are not made on the basis of criticism of 
recent judicial appointments in New Zealand but rather from the concern that future appointments 
may be at risk of improper political influence.  
1 Strength of the constitutional convention 
The first bulwark against political appointments is the convention that the Attorney-General, as 
senior law officer, makes appointments independently of party political considerations.57 The 
Attorney-General is "guardian of the public interest and exercises an independent function not 
shared by other ministers".58 This is reflected in the fact that appointments are announced, but not 
discussed or approved, in Cabinet. 
McGrath contends that the strength of this convention is often underestimated and that holders 
of offices governed by conventional duties have a strong sense of obligation not to fail in those 
responsibilities.59 Then Solicitor-General Terence Arnold QC expressed similar sentiments, saying 
"[t]hese conventions are robust, essentially as a result of the scrupulous way in which they have 
been understood and observed by the relevant actors over many years".60 Although an Attorney-
  
55  McGrath, above n 26, at 316. But see Allan, above n 35, at 105, where it is suggested that senior judges may 
have an informal veto if they are dead set against someone. 
56  McGrath, above n 26, at 316.  
57  Ministry of Justice, above n 33, at [29]. 
58  Joseph, above n 27, at 67. 
59  McGrath, above n 26, at 317. Also see Palmer, above n 8, at 44. 
60  Arnold, above n 36, at 7. 
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General could foreseeably breach this convention, McGrath offers the reminder that "this can be 
said of many of our offices that are restrained by constitutional conventions".61  
While it is true that all conventions are by their very nature at risk of being ignored, the 
operation of some conventions permits significantly more public oversight than others. It would be 
widely known, for example, if the Governor-General breached convention by refusing to assent to 
legislation or by acting contrary to a Minister's advice and an appropriate response to the breach 
could accordingly be formulated. Conversely, there is much less scope for public confirmation or 
verification of the convention's strength in respect of judicial appointments. Only the Attorney-
General can know whether the appointment was driven by improper considerations.  
The convention demanding independence in judicial appointments is therefore unlike other 
conventions that restrain the exercise of certain public offices as the public rely heavily on the 
integrity and assurances of "insiders" to assess its strength. Unsurprisingly, this provides a lesser 
sense of certainty about the reliability of the process. McCormick, speaking of the situation in 
Canada where a very similar appointments process was adopted, summarised the problem:62 
It may well be that the right people are involved, that they are making their decisions on defensible 
criteria, and that their advice is strictly followed by the politicians, with purely professional 
considerations always being preemptive – but since we do not know that this is the case, we have to take 
it on faith, and this phrase is the very antithesis of transparency. 
The confirmation from several Attorneys-General and Solicitors-General that appointments 
occur independently of political considerations certainly increases confidence in the process. 
However, doubts are always likely to linger and perceptions of bias arise, regardless of how 
impartial appointments are in practice, simply by virtue of the fact that appointments are made by a 
government minister without public oversight.63 This sentiment is exacerbated in a society 
increasingly willing to question authority figures and demand greater transparency.64  
2 Political accountability 
In addition to the convention against political appointments, a second bulwark exists. As the 
Attorney-General is a minister, appointments can be subjected to the political accountability that 
corresponds with that office. This form of protection has two manifestations, both internal and 
  
61  McGrath, above n 26, at 317.  
62  McCormick, above n 19, at 24–25. 
63  See Jeffrey Jowell "The Growing International Consensus in Favour of Independent Judicial Appointment 
Commissions" in Judicial Appointments: Balancing Independence, Accountability and Legitimacy (Judicial 
Appointments Commission, 2010) 1 at 3. 
64  For discussion of this change in public attitudes, see for example Thomas Eichelbaum "The Inaugural Neil 
Williamson Memorial Lecture: Judicial Independence Revisited" (1997) 6 Canta LR 421 at 421. 
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external. The internal component is that accountability to Parliament, and therefore the public, 
affects the conscience of the Attorney-General and "brings home to [him or her] … the need to 
make appointments on merit".65 
The second, external manifestation is that the Attorney-General may be questioned and held to 
account for his or her choices, including through Select Committee examination.66 Allan drew on 
the 2004 appointments to the new Supreme Court to illustrate the efficacy of this form of protection. 
He contended that, notwithstanding the absence of legal limits, political limits constrained the 
Attorney-General's exercise of discretion when appointing members of the new Supreme Court and 
led to the decision to elevate the then four most senior members of the Court of Appeal bench.67  
However, it is contended here that such political limitations are less effective under ordinary 
circumstances when a single judge is appointed. The initial elevations to the Supreme Court, where 
Allan suggests that political opposition and pressures were able to be mobilised, was a unique 
situation as the issue played out publicly. Conversely, as the appointments process typically operates 
with little transparency it would be difficult to mobilise political opposition if it was suspected that 
an ordinary appointment was made, or a candidate was rejected, on inappropriate grounds. Former 
Chief Justice Sir Thomas Eichelbaum reminds us that "[w]hat remain unknown and unseen are the 
cases where for politically influenced reasons, particular persons are not appointed".68 The 
protection afforded by political accountability is fairly weak given that appointments occur in the 
absence of open and transparent procedures. 
The primary disadvantages of the present system of appointments are its lack of transparency 
and the fact that the Attorney-General exercises a wide degree of discretion, with little beyond his or 
her integrity to safeguard the apolitical nature of appointments. The next part examines Canada's 
experience after its Charter was adopted, to help assess whether New Zealand's present 
appointments system should be retained if a supreme law Bill of Rights is enacted. 
IV IS THE PRESENT SYSTEM SUITABLE? CANADA'S 
EXPERIENCE 
Canada provides a case study in how enacting a supreme law instrument affects judicial 
independence and judicial appointments. Canada did not address the collateral issue of judicial 
appointments when its Charter was enacted. Post-Charter, appointments came under far greater 
scrutiny and the existing appointments system was widely criticised, but lasting and substantial 
reform has not been forthcoming.  
  
65  McGrath, above n 26, at 316 
66  Palmer, above n 8, at 42. 
67  Allan, above n 35, at 106–107. 
68  Eichelbaum, above n 64, at 427.  
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A Why Canada? 
Because of its similarities with New Zealand and the fact that it moved from an instrument 
similar to NZBORA to the Charter, Canada is a useful case study. Like New Zealand, Canada was a 
colony that imported the common law and legal traditions of the United Kingdom with appeals to 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ending in 1949.69 Unlike New Zealand, Canada's 
federal system of provinces and territories affects judicial appointments; there are both federal and 
provincial courts, with a hierarchy within each category and varied systems of appointment. This 
article focuses on appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) because these appointments 
in particular came under increased scrutiny post-Charter and were substantially reformed as a result. 
The precursor to the Charter was the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights, an ordinary federal statute 
with the same status as NZBORA. It was perceived as ineffective because of courts' hesitance to use 
the law forcefully,70 so in 1982 the Charter, a comprehensive Bill of Rights with supreme law 
status, was enacted. 
The Charter makes several concessions to parliamentary sovereignty. Like s 5 of NZBORA, s 1 
of the Charter provides that the rights and freedoms are "subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". The 
"Notwithstanding Clause" allows provincial and federal legislatures to approve the application of a 
law notwithstanding a judicial finding that it breaches the Charter, but is rarely used.71 
At the time the Charter was enacted, SCC appointments occurred in a manner very similar to 
New Zealand's present system. Appointments were made by the Governor-General who was advised 
by the Prime Minister for appointment of the Chief Justice, and the Minister of Justice, likely with 
the Prime Minister's input, for other SCC appointments.72Although appointments before 1970 were 
frequently based on political connections,73 a major change in focus meant that appointments since 
  
69  See McCormick, above n 19, at 8–9 for further background on this reform.  
70  Munroe Eagles and Sharon A Manna "Politics and Government" in Patrick James and Mark Kasoff (eds) 
Canadian Studies in the New Millennium (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2008) 65 at 91. Notably the 
Supreme Court did find one law "inoperable" due to breach of the Bill of Rights: see R v Drybones [1970] 
SCR 282. 
71  Janet Hiebert "New Constitutional Ideas: Can Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When 
Interpreting Rights?" (2004) 82 Tex L Rev 1963 at 1967–1968. Also see James Allan Democracy in 
Decline: Steps in the Wrong Direction (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2014) at 28–29.  
72  Peter Hogg "Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court of Canada" (2006) 44 
Osgoode Hall LJ 527 at 528.  
73  See McCormick, above n 19, at 14; and R Blake Brown "The Supreme Court of Canada and Judicial 
Legitimacy: The Rise and Fall of Chief Justice Lyman Poore Duff" (2002) 47 McGill LJ 559 at 566. 
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that time were driven predominantly by competence rather than patronage.74 Research reveals no 
reference to constitutional conventions governing the non-political nature of appointments, thus the 
protection of this value appears weaker than in New Zealand. 
B Public Perception 
This section outlines the public's response to the judiciary's ability to make policy-laden 
decisions, in particular highlighting several worrying cases where civil society groups attempted to 
lobby decision makers on appointments. This illustrates the additional pressure and scrutiny placed 
on the judicial appointments system in the post-Charter environment. 
1 Public opinion 
Public perceptions of the judiciary and judicial appointments have been affected by the Charter. 
A 2002 poll indicated that two thirds of the public supported popular election of SCC judges.75 
Although research reveals no equivalent polling from before the Charter's adoption, this number is 
surprisingly high and was seen by Morton to reflect Canadians' increased awareness of judges' 
policy-making function.76 Another 2003 poll found that Canadians were concerned by the increased 
law-making function of judges, finding that 71 per cent of Canadians agreed that "it should be up to 
Parliament and provincial legislatures, not the courts, to make laws in Canada".77 
2 Lobbying 
Recognising the increased power of judges, many civil society groups have responded by 
seeking to influence judicial appointments. The National Action Committee on the Status of Women 
began in 1981 to lobby for the appointment of a woman "acceptable to [their] purposes" on the 
SCC.78 Their later "influencing the influencers" campaign aimed to influence judicial appointments 
and judges' ongoing professional education.79 A prominent judgment concerning abortion prompted 
a member of Choose Life Canada to say that her group would attempt to influence future 
  
74  Lori Hausegger, Matthew Hennigar and Troy Riddell Canadian Courts: Law, Politics, and Process (Oxford 
University Press, Toronto, 2009) at 167. 
75  Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman and David Taras The Last Word: Media Coverage of the Supreme 
Court of Canada (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2006) at 28.  
76  FL Morton "Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada: A System in Transition" in Kate Malleson and 
Peter H Russell (eds) Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the 
World (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006) 56 at 56. 
77  Morton, above n 76, at 56. 
78  Justice Committee "National Action Committee on the Status of Women Memo" (September 1981) at 5; 
and Justice Committee "National Action Committee on the Status of Women Memo" (March 1981) at 4, as 
cited in Morton, above n 76, at 60.  
79  Morton, above n 76, at 61. 
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appointments.80 The President of an opposing organisation responded that, while her group had 
never tried to influence appointments previously, it would if necessary in the future.81 The gay 
rights advocacy group ÉGALE lobbied members of the Government about a SCC appointment and, 
remarkably, members of the group even had a copy of the Government's shortlist of candidates.82 
Whether or not these efforts succeeded, the problem is the perception that significant lobbying 
efforts have occurred and could influence the appointment. Williams points out that lobbying an 
individual decision maker is more likely to be successful than influencing, for example, an 
appointments commission.83 Concern about this kind of improper influence can have a 
delegitimising effect regardless of its impact on the ultimate decision.  
Lobbying was not restricted to civil society groups; Canadian Members of Parliament (MPs) 
have similarly stated the importance of influencing appointments. James Jepson MP said that "[w]e 
now have a chance to put men and women on the bench with a more conservative point of view".84  
Although at the time his comments represented a "sharp break" from Canadian practice, in 
retrospect they are seen as "mark[ing] the beginning of a growing demand for greater transparency 
and public participation in Supreme Court appointments".85  
C Reform of Judicial Appointments 
The SCC appointment system has undergone significant reform over the past decade. Although 
questions have been raised about the political neutrality of some appointments, concern about 
existing examples of patronage was not the main trigger for reform; instead it was the judiciary's 
increased power compared to the legislature and concern about the lack of transparency that drove 
reform.86 There seems to have been a genuine desire to involve Parliament in the process and 
enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Court. After the Prime Minister criticised the "democratic 
deficit" in Canada, due partly to the judicial appointments system, the House of Commons Justice 
Committee suggested as more transparent alternatives the creation of an appointments commission 
  
80  "Public to demand say in Court Appointments" Lawyers Weekly (12 February 1988) at 1, as cited in Morton, 
above n 76, at 61. 
81  "Public to demand say in Court Appointments" Lawyers Weekly (12 February 1988) at 1, as cited in Morton, 
above n 76, at 61. 
82  FL Morton "To Bring Judicial Appointments Out of the Closet" Globe and Mail (Toronto, 22 September 
1997, A15) in Morton, above n 11, at 154.  
83  Williams, above n 25, at 62. 
84  Morton, above n 76, at 61. 
85  Morton, above n 76, at 61. 
86  See Gee, above n 23, at 109. 
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and legislative scrutiny of prospective nominees.87 Attempts to implement these recommendations 
are examined below. 
1 Early reforms 
In 2004 the Minister of Justice announced that two SCC nominees would be subject to 
parliamentary review. Despite lofty goals, the review was fairly innocuous: it occurred in a single 
session one day after the announcement, very few MPs were involved, the panel had no power to 
delay or veto the nomination and, most surprisingly, the panel questioned neither the candidates 
themselves nor the Prime Minister who selected them; instead, questions were directed to the 
Minister of Justice who stated explicitly that the appointment had not been his decision.88 One 
journalist likened this as akin to "sending your mother to do your job interview".89 
Given the disdain that had greeted the previous attempt to add greater transparency to the 
process, a new approach involving an Advisory Committee was announced in 2005.90 There were 
several problems, including that the Committee was dominated by politicians and federal 
appointees91 and had a very narrow role cutting an eight-person shortlist provided by the 
Department of Justice to three persons. In-person interviews of candidates would not be permitted 
and the Committee could not add additional names to the initial eight. A decision would ultimately 
be made by the Prime Minister who could make an appointment from outside the shortlist if 
considered necessary. The Minister of Justice would appear before the Justice Committee to explain 
the process after each appointment. 
After this Committee created its shortlist, the governing party lost an election. One of the 
policies of the newly elected Conservative Government was a public, parliamentary interview for 
proposed SCC appointees.92 Thus the new Government chose one name from the shortlist created 
by the former Government's Advisory Committee and had the nominee, Marshall Rothstein, appear 
before the Justice Committee. 
  
87  Hausegger, Hennigar and Riddell, above n 74, at 169. 
88  McCormick, above n 19, at 29. 
89  Hausegger, Hennigar and Riddell, above n 74, at 169. 
90  Ministry of Justice Proposal to Reform the Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Process (April 2005). 
This proposal is explained and critiqued by McCormick, above n 19, at 38–41.   
91  The Committee was comprised of one member nominated by each political party recognised in the House of 
Commons, one retired judge, one member nominated by the Attorney-General of the relevant province for 
which the appointment is made, one member nominated by the law society of the relevant province and two 
lay members nominated by the Minister of Justice. 
92  Hogg, above n 72, at 529.  
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2 Legislative hearings  
Over a three-hour televised session, Rothstein was questioned by 12 MPs representing the 
various political parties. A constitutional expert moderated the session and outlined the types of 
questions that were not appropriate, for example, the nominee's position on hypothetical cases or 
why he decided a particular case the way he did.93 The MPs were "extremely polite and deferential", 
some apologetic that he was even subjected to the review, and far less aggressive in their 
questioning than their American counterparts; while some MPs raised controversial topics like 
abortion, the Chair told the nominee that a response was not necessary.94 Committee members had 
no voting power but were invited to submit their views to the Prime Minister, who later formally 
announced Rothstein's appointment.95  
This new process was controversial. Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin opposed the hearing, as 
did various former Presidents of the Canadian Bar Association and other prominent legal 
professionals.96  
A different process again was adopted in 2008. A committee of five MPs – two from the 
Government caucus and one from each opposition party – would privately review a list of names put 
forward by the Government and produce a three-person shortlist.97 However, the Committee 
descended into partisan bickering and an election intervened before the nominee could appear, as 
intended, before a parliamentary committee. There was essentially a reversion to the original 
process and the Prime Minister simply announced the nomination of Thomas Cromwell following 
discussions with the Leader of the Opposition.98 
After this episode, some consistency in the process was achieved.99 Several subsequent 
appointments were made where a committee of MPs reviewed a list of candidates to form a shortlist 
from which the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice selected the final candidate. The composition 
of these committees was however odd: only MPs were involved and in each case a majority of 
members were from the governing party. A legislative hearing with the chosen candidate then took 
place. 
  
93  Hogg, above n 72, at 538. 
94  Hausegger, Hennigar and Riddell, above n 74, at 142. 
95  Hogg, above n 72, at 530.  
96  Jacob Ziegel "A New Era in the Selection of Supreme Court Judges" (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall LJ 547 at 548. 
97  Department of Justice of Canada "Minister of Justice Announces Selection Process for the Supreme Court 
of Canada" (press release, 28 May 2008). 
98  Adam Dodek "Reforming the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 2004-2014: A Ten Year Democratic 
Audit" (Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2014-07, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, 2013) at 15. 
99  See Dodek, above n 98, at 14–17.  
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After several years of consistency, appointments returned to a state of flux in 2013 following the 
appointment of Marc Nadon. After being sworn in as a SCC Judge, his appointment was nullified by 
the Supreme Court as he was deemed ineligible based on legislation requiring that three SCC Judges 
be from Quebec.100 Further problems arose because the shortlist created by the committee of MPs 
was subsequently leaked to the media.101 The appointment of Clément Gascon was simply 
announced by the Prime Minister. This reversion to the original appointments process allegedly 
occurred because the Government "no longer trusted" the reformed appointments system.102  
Similarly, the most recent appointment of Suzanne Côté did not involve a legislative hearing.103 It is 
unclear what process will be adopted in future but appears the present Government no longer has 
confidence in the new process it implemented. 
V REFORMING APPOINTMENTS IN NEW ZEALAND 
Canada's experience – enacting the Charter while initially retaining a judicial appointments 
system similar to New Zealand's – offers several insights of relevance to New Zealand. It suggests 
that reform of New Zealand's appointments system would be necessary and indicates how that 
reform should proceed. 
A Reform is Needed  
Canada's experience shows that enacting a supreme law Bill of Rights is likely to expose New 
Zealand's judicial appointments system to far greater scrutiny and it seems unlikely to be able to 
withstand the additional pressure inevitably placed upon it. Canada enacted a supreme law 
instrument but did not concurrently address the collateral consequences of this reform; it "never 
really worked through the implications of wedding … an American-style interventionist court with a 
traditionally English style of appointing judges".104  
The principal disadvantage of the previous Canadian approach was the wide discretion exercised 
by members of the government through a secretive process and without public oversight, where 
their integrity was the main safeguard of political neutrality in appointments. The ease with which 
  
100  In the Matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council concerning sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, as set out in Order in Council P.C. 2013-1105 dated October 22, 2013 [2014] 1 
SCR 433.  
101  See Sean Fine "The secret short list that provoked the rift between Chief Justice and PMO" Globe and Mail 
(online ed, Toronto, 23 May 2013).  
102  Sean Fine "Legal observers worry future judicial appointments will be done in secret" Globe and Mail 
(online ed, Toronto, 18 September 2014). Also see Kim Mackrael and Sean Fine "Tories changed tack on 
Supreme Court appointments after Globe report" Globe and Mail (online ed, Toronto, 16 September 2014). 
103  Sean Fine "PM picks Quebec lawyer Suzanne Côté for Supreme Court seat” Globe and Mail (online ed, 
Toronto, 27 November 2014). 
104  McCormick, above n 19, at 17, referring to Morton, above n 76. 
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the system could be criticised meant that, following high-profile Charter cases, the media and 
politicians increasingly questioned how appointments were made.105 Judicial appointments also 
became a prominent political issue; parties campaigned on policies regarding judicial appointments 
and a sub-theme of the 2004 federal general election campaign was a concern about the kind of 
judicial appointments that a new conservative Prime Minister might make.106 The system's fragility 
was exposed and over time, almost every major Canadian newspaper noted the growing political 
influence of Canada's judges and criticised the nature of their appointment.107  
Canada's experience suggests that if New Zealand enacts a supreme law Bill of Rights, the 
judicial appointments system will similarly be subject to significantly more scrutiny. It has not been 
immune to criticism even in the absence of a supreme law Bill of Rights; a former Chief Justice, 
former President of the Court of Appeal and former Attorney-General have, among others, called for 
reform.108 As occurred in Canada, these calls are only likely to grow louder and more widespread 
once judges have the power to strike down legislation. 
New Zealand's present appointments process shares the same fundamental weaknesses as the 
previous Canadian system. The non-political nature of appointments is predominantly safeguarded 
by the integrity of a member of the executive rather than by formal checks and balances. Too much 
power is concentrated in the hands of one individual, especially since the power to shape the courts' 
composition would be more potent than ever if judges were capable of striking down legislation. 
The appointments process lacks transparency and is closed and exclusive; it "makes no effort to 
elicit the support for the appointments of members of the legislature, whose laws the appointee will 
eventually review".109 Thus the present system of appointments is insufficiently robust to withstand 
the scrutiny that will inevitably be placed upon it should a supreme law Bill of Rights be enacted. 
Reform of the process should occur. 
B Character of the Necessary Reform 
This consideration of the Canadian experience offers four broad conclusions about the process 
that should be adopted in reforming judicial appointments: reform should be proactive, codified, 
nonpartisan and responsive.  
  
105  See for example Sauvageau, Schneiderman and Taras, above n 75, at 159–160, which considers the 
widespread coverage of the Supreme Court's decision in R v Marshall, including criticism of judicial 
appointments and calls for a more transparent system. Also see Jacob Ziegel "Merit, Selection and 
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106  McCormick, above n 19, at 27. For example the Conservative Party campaigned on a policy of public 
parliamentary interviews for proposed SCC appointees. 
107  Hausegger, Hennigar and Riddell, above n 74, at 141.  
108  See Eichelbaum, above n 64; Cooke, above n 22; and Wilson, above n 36. 
109  Jowell, above n 63, at 3.  
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1 Proactive  
First, reform of judicial appointments should be proactive in that New Zealand should consider 
changing how judges are appointed prior to or alongside a decision to enact a supreme law Bill of 
Rights. There is a contrary argument that a supreme law Bill of Rights should be enacted without 
addressing collateral issues like judicial appointments. On this view, it is unnecessary to pre-empt 
the effects of such reform and prematurely respond to problems that may not eventuate.  
Canada’s experience shows why this argument – the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" approach to 
law reform – is problematic. Despite recognition of the need for improvement, in Canada there has 
been little agreement on the appropriate reform. The appointments models adopted since 2004 have 
varied widely: some appointments have involved a screening or appointments commission (of 
differing compositions, most recently made solely of MPs, the majority of which were from the 
governing party), others have included legislative hearings and others have been made by reverting 
to the previous system.110 
Why has achieving lasting change been so difficult in Canada? Commentators see the 
government's vested interest in retaining control over appointments as a major inhibitor to 
substantive reform. The government's main concern, it is suggested, is with superficial appearances 
rather than genuine improvement.111 
Failing to address wider issues like judicial appointments before enacting a supreme law Bill of 
Rights risks creating a political environment in which achieving genuine reform becomes 
increasingly difficult. To avoid this, proactive reform which addresses collateral issues like judicial 
appointments alongside the decision to adopt a supreme law Bill of Rights is desirable. A similar 
argument is often advanced in favour of enacting a supreme law Bill of Rights itself; even in the 
absence of rights infringements in the past "[i]t is much better not to wait for a flood before we build 
the dam. The planning and building should take account of the threat by careful thought and 
execution in advance."112 Furthermore, Paul East suggested that a judicial appointments 
commission, once created, would be politically impossible to disband.113 This scenario illustrates 
the desirability of a measured approach to reform over a knee-jerk response to sudden pressures 
placed on the system. 
  
110  Dodek, above n 98, at 14–17. 
111  McCormick, above n 19, at 42. 
112  Palmer, above n 4, at [4.24]. 
113  East, above n 36, at 190. 
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2 Codified 
The second conclusion is that reform should be codified. The changes in Canada were not and 
instead the process to be adopted was simply announced by the Minister of Justice when a vacancy 
arose.114 The series of fluctuating and inconsistent methods of appointment adopted in Canada 
undermine the aims of increasing transparency and public confidence in appointments, thus 
codification of changes is a desirable way of ensuring greater consistency in the way judges are 
appointed. 
3 Nonpartisan 
Thirdly, any reform should be nonpartisan. That was not the case in Canada; as outlined above, 
the varying systems of appointment have taken place under two governments and the method of 
appointing judges became a political issue. Appointments are presently in a state of flux and it is not 
clear what system a new government would adopt, given the inconsistencies in approach adopted by 
the present Government. This is a worrying state of affairs for an issue of constitutional 
significance. A nonpartisan approach to reform would go some way towards insulating 
appointments from political attacks and ensuring consistency in the method of appointment. 
4 Responsive 
The fourth conclusion is that reform of appointments must respond to the problem. Canada 
failed to precisely define the present problem and respond substantively to it and consequently, the 
value of its reforms is undermined. 
The legislative hearing process in Canada did little to limit the Prime Minister's exercise of 
discretion. While the Prime Minister contended that the hearing process "brought unprecedented 
openness and accountability to the process",115 this is an overstatement considering that many 
questions were off limits and the hearings did not offer reasons why one candidate was chosen over 
another qualified individual. Furthermore, many of the questions asked at the various hearings were 
inane and gave MPs little information of value in determining whether the appointee was 
qualified.116 The MPs had no voting power and the nomination could have proceeded even if they 
had expressed disapproval of the nominee. Therefore the reform appears to be little more than 
  
114  See for example Department of Justice of Canada "Minister of Justice Announces Selection Process for the 
Supreme Court of Canada" (press release, 28 May 2008). 
115  Prime Minister's Office "Prime Minister announces appointment of Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein to the 
Supreme Court" (press release, 1 March 2006). 
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rubber stamping of nominees; it creates a public process but does not truly create a check on the 
Prime Minister's exercise of discretion. 
The more recent involvement of a committee of Canadian MPs is also of questionable value. 
The composition of these committees gave the governing party's MPs a majority, and non-political 
actors like judges or law society representatives were excluded. The dominance of government MPs, 
and the absence of independent non-political actors, means that the committee cannot be considered 
an impartial body independent of government.  
Thus the problem with this reform is that it does not act as an effective and independent check 
on the Prime Minister's exercise of discretion. The value of the legislative hearing was instead to 
allow MPs and the public to get to know the appointee and to hear their views on, for example, their 
role as judges or their understanding of Charter rights. The hearing, Hogg contended, sent a 
reassuring message about the nominee's abilities and integrity.117 He also saw the hearing as a 
useful antidote to charges of judicial activism that frequently arise following unpopular decisions.118 
While these are undoubtedly positive consequences, they do not address one of the main 
problems with the present system: the lack of checks on the executive's responsibility for judicial 
appointments. There was a failure to define the precise nature of the problem and respond 
accordingly, meaning the reforms enacted in Canada are more superficial than substantive. 
Therefore the next section attempts to define the present problem, creating a framework within 
which possible reforms can be assessed. 
C The Purpose of Reform 
To enact responsive and lasting reform, it is necessary to identify precisely what it aims to 
achieve. McGrath summarised the goals of an appointments system as protecting political neutrality, 
adherence to merit based criteria, maintaining public confidence in the judiciary and accountability 
for appointments.119  
The first value identified – political neutrality – is of central importance in a system with a 
supreme law Bill of Rights. It comprises twin goals: to enhance the political neutrality of 
appointments and prevent the government from being able to stack a court, and to quell the 
perception that ideological appointments could occur. Even if appointments are politically neutral in 
fact, unless they are perceived to be so the door is open to political sensations and attacks in 
response to appointments or following unpopular judgments. As discussed above, part of a Canadian 
federal election campaign concerned the sorts of conservative judicial appointments that a new 
  
117  Hogg, above n 72, at 534.  
118  Hogg, above n 72, at 534.  
119  McGrath, above n 26, at 317. 
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government might make.120 These sorts of attacks have a corrosive effect on public confidence in 
the judiciary's independence and the appointments system should aim to reduce the risk that they 
would occur. 
Secondly, McGrath emphasises adherence to merit-based criteria. Undoubtedly, appointments 
must be based on merit but this does not mean legal ability alone. The appointments system should 
also foster the appointment of individuals with empathy and encourage diversity of experience 
among appointees as these characteristics, while important in any group of judges, are of heightened 
importance when judges have the ability to strike down laws. Jeffrey Jowell suggests that "qualities 
such as social sensitivity or political sagacity" are needed if a supreme law Bill of Rights is 
enacted.121 Similarly, to Canadian Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, it is particularly important that 
judges possess the following qualities in the post-Charter environment:122 
…they must remain in touch with the world about them if they are to render relevant and helpful 
decisions. It is also obvious that the composition of the courts should reflect insofar as possible the 
broad mosaic of our society, the better to guard against the predominance of uniform insularity.  
McGrath also notes that public confidence in the judiciary must be protected. In addition to 
maintaining confidence in the judiciary's independence, the appointments system should also foster 
the democratic legitimacy of judges to avoid the perception of a democratic deficit, a concern that 
arose in Canada.123 The reduction in Parliament's law-making authority and the transfer of power to 
the courts may be perceived as undemocratic, heightening the importance of democratic legitimacy 
in a supreme law Bill of Rights environment.  
Accountability for appointments is the fourth value and is linked to the point on public 
confidence. If judicial appointments are made without sufficient input from elected representatives, 
weakening the sense of accountability to the public, the judiciary risks being perceived as elitist and 
unqualified to assess the policy and political considerations that may inform a decision to strike 
down legislation. Other factors include protecting confidentiality to avoid deterring possible 
candidates from seeking judicial office; avoiding unnecessary expense or administrative burdens; 
and accordance with New Zealand's common law tradition and political culture. 
While a key goal of reform is to create a system where judicial appointments are perceived to 
be, and are in fact, free from the sorts of improperly political considerations identified above, this  
cannot be the sole focus at the expense of the other values identified. The following parts explore 
various options for reform and assess their performance against the aforementioned criteria. 
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VI OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
A The Judicature Modernisation Bill 
The Judicature Modernisation Bill arose following a Law Commission report. The Commission 
endorsed the status quo appointments system with recommendations designed to increase its 
transparency and ensure consistency in its application.124 Several of these recommendations were 
not included in the subsequent Judicature Modernisation Bill but with little explanation for their 
omission. It is suggested here that the Commission's recommendations are valuable but insufficient 
alone to respond to the issues raised in this article. 
One recommendation that was accepted by the Government would require the Attorney-General 
to publish the process he or she would follow in soliciting and advancing nominations for judicial 
appointment.125 A second would codify the requirement that the Attorney-General consult various 
individuals, including senior judges, the Solicitor-General and the Presidents of the Law Society and 
Bar Association, before making appointments or elevations to the higher courts.126 The inclusion of 
elevations in this recommendation accorded with the view of many submitters to the Commission 
who saw the consultation process as being of equal, if not greater, importance for judicial elevations 
as for the initial appointment.127 The Commission was of the view that this would not create an 
undue administrative burden on those involved as relatively few appellate appointments are made 
each year.128 
It is appropriate that the Commission considered elevations to be equally as important as initial 
appointments. Elevations to higher courts are particularly significant and likely to attract the most 
attention if a supreme law Bill of Rights were enacted, given that decisions striking down legislation 
are likely to be appealed to the Supreme Court. 
In addition, while recognising that no single template is achievable or desirable for New Zealand 
judges, the Commission also suggested some general principles that an Attorney-General ought to 
observe in making appointments129 and recommended that criteria for appointment be included in 
statute.130 
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The Ministry of Justice, in a document explaining the Judicature Modernisation Bill's changes to 
judicial appointments, accepted that "scope exists to achieve greater clarity and transparency in the 
judicial appointment process, given the limited publicly available information".131 Despite this 
recognition, the Bill is significantly less comprehensive than the Commission recommended. The 
Bill codifies neither the requirement for consultation with specified individuals nor criteria for 
appointment; instead cl 93 sets out a requirement for the publication of information concerning the 
appointments process:132  
93 Attorney-General to publish information concerning judicial appointment process 
The Attorney-General must publish information explaining his or her process for— 
(a) seeking expressions of interest for the appointment of Judges and Associate Judges; and 
(b) recommending persons for appointment as a Judge or an Associate Judge. 
While cl 93 improves the present system, it falls short of what the Commission proposed with 
little discussion of or explanation for the omissions. A response to the Commission's report from the 
Minister of Justice suggested that a desire to retain flexibility led to the view that criteria for 
appointment should not be codified.133 Although this approach accords with the view of some 
submitters,134 the majority agreed that there should be statutory criteria,135 and submitters almost 
unanimously agreed with the other significant proposal – that consultation with specified individuals 
should be mandatory and formalised in legislation.136 It is unfortunate that the Commission's 
measured reforms, which would enhance the transparency of the appointments process and ensure 
greater consistency in its application, were largely rejected without sufficient explanation. 
The Commission's report offers welcome improvements and is an appropriate response to 
current concerns about judicial appointments, but it is not sufficient to address the issues raised in 
this article because the Attorney-General would retain wide discretion over appointments. The 
subdued nature of the recommendations was recognised by the Commission; its focus was "a 
  
131  Office of the Minister of Justice, Cabinet Social Policy Committee Government response to the Law 
Commission's Report: Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New Courts Act (Ministry of Justice, 
Wellington, April 2013) at [31]. 
132  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178-2), cl 93.  
133  Office of the Minister of Justice, above n 131, at [31]–[32]. 
134  Law Commission, above n 47, at [5.42]. 
135  At [5.43].  
136  At [5.54]–[5.55].  
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modest consolidation project".137 Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond the Judicature 
Modernisation Bill to seek more comprehensive options for reform. 
B Election and Formal Training 
Although some jurisdictions elect judges, this undermines the independence of the judiciary and 
with it the rule of law. Election is unlikely to be favoured in New Zealand and can be dismissed as a 
feasible or desirable possibility. Friedland, although writing in the Canadian context, summarised 
the case against electing judges:138 
Few things would be more destructive of the independence of the judiciary than to have judges 
campaign for office accepting contributions to pay for their campaigns, let alone having to run on a law-
and-order platform. 
Similarly, the civil law model where judges are formally trained in a separate career path to 
lawyers is not considered here because New Zealand's common law tradition, where most judges 
have had at least 15 years of experience in legal practice, is very likely to be retained in the future. 
Any reform must conform to this tradition.  
C Public Legislative Hearings 
Legislative hearings at which nominees are questioned by elected representatives take place in 
Canada and the United States. Under this reform, the present system of appointment would be 
retained but a candidate selected by the Attorney-General would appear before a committee of MPs 
prior to being officially appointed by the Governor-General. The varying forms that legislative 
hearings could take are discussed below but ultimately it is contended that public hearings are not a 
desirable reform. 
The American model for Supreme Court confirmation hearings should not be adopted in New 
Zealand. Given that the hearings are conducted publicly and Senators can block a Supreme Court 
nominee, the hearings are characterised by aggressive questioning and politicking.139  
An alternative is the Canadian model where MPs question appointees at a public hearing but 
cannot vote. The absence of voting "lowers the temperature" of the hearing and purportedly makes 
the occasion less political.140 However, the process also comes across as superficial rather than as a 
real check on the decision maker because the government can insist on its nominee regardless of the 
hearing's outcome. As MPs could not vote to show their opposition to a candidate, they may 
  
137  At [5.32]. 
138  Friedland, above n 19, at 58.  
139  Hausegger, Hennigar and Riddell, above n 74, at 142. 
140  Hogg, above n 72, at 532. 
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publicly express their concerns which would be damaging to the candidate if they were nevertheless 
appointed to the bench.   
Furthermore, the absence of voting is not a guarantee that MPs would conduct themselves in an 
appropriate manner. Although the first Canadian hearing was polite, in 2011 SCC appointee 
Michael Moldaver was subjected to "glib and disrespectful challenges" concerning his inability to 
speak French; he was asked over five times about this issue and was asked one question in French, 
an approach surely meant only to embarrass him.141 The presence of a Canadian constitutional 
expert moderating the session did not prevent these sorts of attacks. Unfortunately, New Zealand's 
political culture means that MPs would be likely to behave similarly and undermine the value of the 
process, using it as an opportunity to score political points. Therefore, public legislative hearings in 
either the American or Canadian model should not be adopted in New Zealand.  
VII PRIVATE CONFIRMATION 
Given the problems associated with public hearings, an alternative reform would create a private 
process through which an individual or group confirms the suitability of the appointment. Under this 
model, the Attorney-General could nominate an individual for judicial appointment with the same 
consultative process presently adopted, but the nominee would only be appointed if their 
appointment was confirmed by the specified individual or group. A rejection would require the 
Attorney-General to submit a new candidate. 
Approval of the Attorney-General's nomination could come either from a judge, a group of MPs 
or a specifically constituted committee. The Law Commission raised the possibility that the 
concurrence of the Chief Justice or relevant Head of Bench could be required, creating a judicial 
veto over appointments.142 The problem with this approach is two-fold; it risks self-perpetuation 
within the judiciary143 and does too little to enhance the transparency and democratic legitimacy of 
the process.  
An alternative would require the nominee to appear before a private confirmation hearing 
conducted by MPs – likely the Justice and Electoral Select Committee. The absence of public 
exposure would reduce the incentive for politicking, permitting a more productive session than the 
previously discussed public hearings. However, if the governing party and its partners held a 
majority on the Select Committee, the process may lack the necessary rigour to create a real check 
sufficient to stop political opponents from publicly criticising appointments. A group of MPs may 
  
141  Emmett Macfarlane "Why public hearings with Supreme Court nominees should mean something" (20 
October 2011) Macleans <www.macleans.ca>. 
142  Law Commission, above n 47, at [5.33]. 
143  See McGrath, above n 26, at 316, who suggested that the Attorney-General having discretion over 
appointments, in the absence of a judicial veto, has encouraged the appointment of lawyers with less 
orthodox backgrounds to the bench.  
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also give weight to peripheral considerations rather than the candidate's legal ability and suitability 
for appointment. For example, Justice Rothstein derived support from Canadian MPs for being 
"very 'judge-like'"144 and for "his informality, self-deprecating sense of humour, and willingness to 
explain his judicial philosophy in simple terms".145 The involvement of a number of MPs also 
increases the risk that information would be leaked to the media if politically expedient, particularly 
if a minority of the committee members were opposed to the nominee, potentially deterring good 
candidates from seeking judicial office.  
A third option is the creation of a specifically constituted committee responsible for approving 
the Attorney-General's decision. This committee would be likely to include the Chief Justice and 
Solicitor-General, as representatives of the bench and bar, and could include lay members and MPs. 
Retaining the Attorney-General as the primary decision maker will be seen by proponents of this 
model as its main advantage. Ministerial responsibility is not diluted so the conventions that 
presently govern appointments can continue to operate, but with a genuine check on the Attorney-
General's exercise of discretion. The committee could also provide feedback to the Attorney-
General if it were concerned about, for example, the homogeneity of appointments. The committee's 
voting power and ability to reject a candidate means that it cannot be dismissed as a mere process of 
rubber stamping. 
However, the central role of the Attorney-General is also this proposal's main weakness. One of 
the main problems with the present system is the concentration of decision-making power in one 
person. It is hard to justify why one individual, even a government minister, should have this level 
of influence over the judiciary's composition in a system where judges' powers would be 
substantially wider than at present. This reform does too little to change that. Because the committee 
cannot propose individuals for appointment, but can solely approve or reject the Attorney-General's 
nomination, its influence is fairly limited and does not provide a sufficient counter-balance to the 
government's influence over the process.  
VIII APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION 
An appointments commission is a prominent option for reform; commissions have been adopted 
with increased frequency overseas including in the United Kingdom,146 and commissions have been 
proposed in New Zealand in 1978147 and again in the 1990s, with the idea attracting support from 
  
144  Hausegger, Hennigar and Riddell, above n 74, at 143.  
145  Ziegel, above n 96, at 549. Also see Hogg, above n 116, at 426. 
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appointments commissions.  
147  See "Report of the Royal Commission on the Courts" [1978] VII AJHR H2 at 200–202. The proposed 
commission would have comprised the Chief Justice, the Chief District Court Judge, the Solicitor-General, 
the Secretary for Justice and two New Zealand Law Society nominees.  
 THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SUPREME LAW BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NEW ZEALAND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 523 
Cooke P and Eichelbaum CJ.148 The issue arose again in 2004 when many submissions on the 
legislation creating the Supreme Court expressed distrust of the existing system and supported the 
formation of a judicial appointments commission.149 The Ministry of Justice produced a 
consultation paper150 but the idea was not pursued, although then Attorney-General Margaret 
Wilson still supports the creation of an independent body to recommend appointments.151 
A Appointing or Recommending Commission 
There are broadly two models for an appointments commission. The first has total responsibility 
for the appointment, whereas the second, which is more common overseas, operates as a 
recommending commission which produces a shortlist from which the Attorney-General makes the 
final selection.152  
The primary disadvantage of the first model is the reduction in accountability to Parliament. 
Former Chief Justice of Australia, Sir Anthony Mason, suggested that:153 
… there is a powerful democratic argument against transferring the power of appointment away from 
the executive government to a commission consisting of persons who are not elected by the people. One 
justification for the exercise of judicial power by non-elected Judges in a democracy is that the Judges 
are indirectly appointed by the people in that it is the duly elected government that makes the 
appointments. That is a very important argument which tells against entrusting the power of 
appointment to others, whatever the advantages may be in pursuing such a course.  
Although arguing against an appointments commission, Mason's statement suggests that 
involving the Attorney-General in some capacity is essential to avoid an undesirable reduction in 
democratic legitimacy. This is particularly important given the heightened need to protect the 
democratic legitimacy of judges operating under a supreme law Bill of Rights. The concern in the 
United Kingdom, which could apply equally in New Zealand, was that by removing the Lord 
Chancellor from appointments, he or she would "cease to operate so effectively as a bridge between 
the judiciary and Government".154 Removing the Attorney-General from the process may also make 
  
148  Joseph, above n 18, at [21.4.1(3)]. See also Cooke, above n 22, at 1331; and Eichelbaum, above n 64, at 
427–429.  
149  Ministry of Justice, above n 33, at [16]. See also Joseph, above n 27, at 70. 
150  Ministry of Justice, above n 33. 
151  Wilson, above n 36, at 48. 
152  Straw, above n 24, at 57. 
153  Anthony Mason "The Appointment and Removal of Judges" in Helen Cunnningham (ed) Fragile Bastion 
(Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sydney, 1997) 1 at 16–17.  
154  Ministry of Justice The Governance of Britain: Judicial Appointments (October 2007) at [4.15]. 
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him or her less inclined to defend the judiciary against criticism.155 A tension exists between 
creating a body which is independent of government while still ensuring accountability to 
Parliament and a commission with total responsibility for appointments errs too far to one extreme 
at the expense of accountability. 
Another benefit to the recommending commission compared with the former model concerns 
the quality of candidates appointed for judicial office. Critics of an appointments commission 
express concern that it will encourage the appointment of conventional, compromise candidates,156 
suggesting that the Attorney-General is well-placed to choose candidates with unorthodox 
backgrounds because he or she sees the courts in their wider social and political context.157 Tasking 
the commission with the creation of a shortlist, rather than recommending a single name, goes some 
way to mitigating this concern by ensuring greater scope for the commission to select individuals 
other than the most obvious and conventional candidates. 
One contentious matter is whether the Attorney-General should be bound to accept the 
commission's shortlist. Eichelbaum CJ suggested that the Attorney-General should be free to make 
an appointment from outside the commission's shortlist, but that this would need to be publicly 
notified.158 However, this approach somewhat undermines the value of the reform given that the 
predominant concern with the present system is that there are too few formal checks on the 
Attorney-General. It is instead preferable to require the Attorney-General to select a candidate from 
the commission's shortlist, but he or she should be able to ask the commission to reevaluate its 
recommendation on clearly specified grounds and with reasons provided.159 A shortlist of three 
names would be appropriate; fewer places too significant a limit on the Attorney-General while 
more than three names risks undermining the value of the commission as a check on the decision 
maker.  
B Composition 
A commission's composition and how its members are appointed are highly contentious due to 
the risks that appointments to the commission may themselves become politicised and that the 
commission will be unduly dominated by judges, potentially leading to self-replication within the 
  
155  At [4.15]. 
156  See Robert Stevens The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution (Hart, Oxford, 2002) at 
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159  See Kate Malleson "Creating a Judicial Appointments Commission: Which Model Works Best" [2004] 
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judiciary. The following discussion explains these concerns and contends that the proposed 
commission's composition can alleviate them. 
1 Political appointments to the commission 
Critics suggest that appointments to a commission are at risk of being politicised as the political 
element could simply shift and operate in a more covert manner, where members of the government 
attempt to stack the commission to ensure their preferred candidates are selected.160 This situation 
appears to have occurred in Canada, where the Federal Government added a police representative to 
some federal commissions, seen as an attempt to ensure the appointment of "tough on crime" 
judges, and restricted the judicial representative from voting except in cases of a tie.161 This gave 
the Government the power to appoint a majority of the voting members of the commission and was 
heavily criticised, illustrating the need for a nonpartisan approach to reform to avoid as much as 
possible later alterations to the commission's composition.162  
The appointments commission for England and Wales addresses this concern but in an 
administratively burdensome way. Their 15-person commission is comprised of lay people, lawyers, 
judges and lay judges.163 The three most senior judicial members are appointed by the Judges' 
Council while other commissioners are appointed by the Lord Chancellor after consultation with an 
advisory body comprising the Lord Chief Justice, the chair of the Commission and an additional lay 
member appointed by the Minister.164 Essentially, there is a separate advisory committee whose 
responsibility is appointing members of the appointments commission. This is a cumbersome 
process and its high administrative burden is exacerbated by New Zealand's small size and 
comparatively limited resources. 
A preferable solution is for individuals to sit on the commission by virtue of another office they 
hold. Rather than making specific appointments to the commission, the Solicitor-General for 
example would automatically become a member by virtue of being Solicitor-General. The Ministry 
of Justice's 2004 Consultation Paper suggested the following composition:165 
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 three lay people, who are not practising lawyers and have never held judicial office, appointed by 
the Government; 
 the Chief Justice (or nominee, who is a judge); 
 one other senior judge (e.g. the Chief Judge of the Court in which the vacancy occurs); 
 the President of the New Zealand Law Society (or nominee); 
 the President of the New Zealand Bar Association (or nominee); and 
 one of the following persons:166 
o The Solicitor-General (or Deputy Solicitor-General); 
o The Secretary of Justice (or nominee); 
o The Chief Executive of Te Puni Kōkiri (or nominee). 
Most of these individuals would sit on the appointments commission by virtue of another role, 
circumventing the difficulties that arise when deciding which individuals, for example which judges 
or bar representatives, should be included. However, problems with this approach arise in respect of 
lay members.  
Given the aforementioned concerns about the government appointing members of the 
commission, it is not desirable for the government to appoint three lay members as proposed in the 
2004 Consultation Paper. One solution would be for lay members to also be appointed by virtue of 
an office they hold; for example, the Auditor-General or an Ombudsman could be members of the 
commission. It is suggested here that a better solution is for no lay members to sit on the 
commission. 
Many appointments commissions include a number of lay members, with some comprised of a 
majority of lay members while other are chaired by a lay member.167 The argument for including 
lay members is that they bring fresh ideas and perspectives to the commission to balance the 
influence of judges who may otherwise dominate its decisions and encourage self-replication within 
the judiciary.168 There is some disagreement however about whether lay members can in fact 
balance the influence of judicial representatives. Palmer, for example, expressed concern that judges 
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who sat on the commission would exert great influence over lay members, suggesting this risks 
"turn[ing] the judiciary into a self-perpetuating oligarchy".169 
A better mechanism for balancing the influence of judicial representatives is the inclusion of 
representatives from the bar, like the Solicitor-General and Presidents of the Bar Association and 
Law Society. As legally trained representatives of the bar they are well-positioned to assess the legal 
ability of candidates whereas lay members may be more likely to defer to judicial representatives on 
these matters. 
2 Members of Parliament 
Members of Parliament should sit on the commission, as occurs in several countries including 
South Africa and Israel.170 As the central democratic authority, Parliament has a valid interest in 
judicial appointments, particularly when judges have the ability to strike down legislation. Malleson 
contends that including MPs on a commission increases democratic accountability and hence the 
legitimacy of the process.171 Moreover, Canada's experience showed a very strong desire for MPs to 
be involved in appointments post-Charter with a number of reforms trying to accommodate this. If 
legislative hearings are not implemented in New Zealand – and there are good policy reasons why 
they should not be – another mechanism should be established for involving MPs in the process. 
Shutting MPs out of the appointments process also runs counter to the goal of limiting political 
eruptions or sensations in response to appointments and unpopular judgments. Without their 
inclusion, the commission is at risk of being viewed as too insular and representative of the legal 
establishment. Thus by increasing the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary and reducing the 
likelihood of politicised attacks on judicial appointments, there are reasons of both principle and 
pragmatism for including MPs on the commission. Furthermore, the view that the commission 
should not include lay members strengthens the argument for including MPs: like the Attorney-
General, MPs arguably see the courts within their broader social and political context and may direct 
the commission towards more unorthodox appointments, and their inclusion further mitigates the 
risk of disproportionate judicial influence. 
As with the previously discussed reforms, the involvement of MPs increases the risk that 
confidential information may be leaked. Compared with a post-appointment legislative hearing, the 
risk is perhaps lower here because fewer MPs are involved. While this concern still exists, it is 
managed and outweighed by the benefit brought by their involvement. 
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C The Case for an Appointments Commission 
The foregoing discussion illustrates how several of the most common critiques of an 
appointments commission – that it will be captured by judges or that appointments to the 
commission will be politicised – can largely be mitigated by its composition. Drawing on that 
discussion and other considerations, this section contends that an appointments commission is the 
best option for New Zealand. 
The primary advantage of the commission is that it enhances the political neutrality of 
appointments by shifting decision-making power away from a member of the government to an 
independent body. At present, the political neutrality of the process will inevitably be questioned, 
regardless of how impartial appointments are in practice, because a government minister has largely 
unchecked control over appointments.172 Shifting responsibility to an independent commission 
therefore achieves two of the main policy goals: it creates a genuine check on the Attorney-General, 
reducing his or her ability to stack a court with ideological appointments, and enhances the 
perception that this will not occur. An appointments commission is more effective in this regard 
than a form of committee confirmation as under that model the committee is too weak to effectively 
balance the Attorney-General's power over the process. 
Another advantage of the commission is its transparency and inclusiveness. Legislative hearings 
offer transparency because they are open to the public. The transparency of an appointments 
commission is of a different nature; it is derived from the commission providing an inclusive, 
consistent process which operates independently of the government for both appointments and 
elevations. The existing system does not seek to elicit support for appointments from members of 
the legislature whose laws would eventually be reviewed.173 With a supreme law Bill of Rights this 
weakness becomes more significant given the risk of public resentment of the judiciary’s increased 
power. Involving MPs is valuable because it elicits Parliament's support for appointments without 
creating the problems associated with legislative hearings.  
Some commentators argue that a commission will not remove the risk of politicised 
appointments. Their concern is that a shortlist created by an advisory commission "does not 
diminish or curtail patronage, but 'aids and abets' it by supplying the [member of the executive] with 
cover to take partisan considerations into account".174 Palmer and East both expressed concern 
about the division of responsibility and corresponding lack of accountability that an appointments 
commission brings.175 It is easier to question the propriety of a discretionary appointment made by 
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one person than to question the decisions of an ostensibly independent commission, where the 
division of decision-making power means that accountability can be offloaded to others involved.176 
This is a legitimate concern, but needs to be weighed against the countervailing desirability of 
creating a more open and inclusive appointments process. By spreading the decision-making power 
among a group of people, inevitably the accountability of each individual is reduced. That is the cost 
of a more inclusive system where the influence of one actor is balanced against that of another. 
Furthermore, even if political factors did affect the Attorney-General's selection from the 
shortlist, the commission's value would not be wholly negated. As discussed above, complete 
impartiality is impossible as there are some political matters which will inevitably factor into 
appointments. The value of the commission is that the political element is managed and limited. An 
Attorney-General would not be able to stack the court with ideologically driven candidates; to be 
included on the shortlist, the commission must have confirmed that a candidate is well qualified. 
Thus, regardless of which individual is selected from the shortlist, and the reasons for that decision, 
the public and Parliament can be confident that the appointee is suitable.  
Proponents argue that an appointments commission will increase diversity on the bench. While 
some commentators contend that the appointments commission for England and Wales has 
successfully increased diversity,177 others argue that this reform was not a panacea for increasing 
diversity and was "not the cure that politicians have sought".178 Given the divergence of academic 
opinion, increasing the diversity of the bench does not provide a strong argument either in support 
of or against of an appointments commission. 
Nevertheless, concerns that an appointments commission will give judges undue influence and 
impede the appointment of unconventional candidates are mitigated by the composition and powers 
of the proposed commission. The inclusion of MPs and bar representatives is likely to balance 
judicial influence. Furthermore, the fact that the commission's responsibility is to create a shortlist 
rather than recommend a single name ensures greater scope for the commission to select unorthodox 
candidates. 
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The cost and administrative burden of an appointments commission is often cited as a 
disadvantage.179 The appointments commission for England and Wales, responsible for nominating 
more than 700 judges each year, has 15 commissioners and a significant support staff.180 Its total 
expenditure in 2013/14 was £5.59 million.181 In contrast, New Zealand appoints about 12 judges 
annually.182 Yet despite the differences in size, concerns about ensuring neutrality and increasing 
transparency are equally important in New Zealand as in the United Kingdom.  
It is indisputable that an appointments commission would impose administrative burdens on 
those involved, which would need to be supported with sufficient appropriations. However the low 
number of appointments annually eases the burden on members, most of which are already involved 
with appointments to some degree.183  
D Administrative Aspects 
This section outlines some administrative matters which would contribute to the success of an 
appointments commission in New Zealand. The initial process could be managed by the Solicitor-
General, as currently occurs. Similar levels of consultation, with members of the commission and 
those outside it, would ensure that a wide range of candidates was considered. In consultation with 
the members of the commission, a database of qualified candidates would be created and the 
primary responsibility of the commission would be reviewing this database to create a shortlist of 
three candidates. 
Chen Palmer proposed the creation of an office within Crown Law, headed by a new Deputy 
Solicitor-General, to provide support on judicial appointments.184 The functions of the office would 
include calling for expressions of interest, holding confidential files on future candidates, managing 
interviews and conducting referee checks. Although this was recommended in the context of the 
present appointments system it could equally be adopted as the administrative and support 
component of an appointments commission.  
There should be provision for two MPs to sit on the commission. To ensure that the MPs are 
seen as representing Parliament, one should be drawn from within the governing parties and one 
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from within the parties in opposition. The statute could provide that two MPs are to be designated 
members of the commission by the Prime Minister and by the Leader of the Opposition. Although it 
is likely that those appointed would be legally qualified, this should not be required as other 
experience, for example in making other public appointments, would also be valuable. Commentary 
on the legislation could suggest that the shadow Attorney-General and chairperson of the Justice and 
Electoral Select Committee should be considered for appointment first; they are obvious candidates 
for inclusion as both tend to be consulted during the existing judicial appointments process. 
The appointments commission should operate for appointment and elevations to all courts, as 
was suggested in the 2004 Consultation Paper.185 Some flexibility in the commission's composition 
is necessary to accommodate the burden that it places on its members, so the commission's 
membership would partly depend on the court in which the vacancy arose. The Consultation Paper 
proposed a desirable degree of flexibility in recommending that in addition to the Chief Justice, the 
second judge involved would vary and could be the Head of the Bench of the court in which the 
vacancy occurs.186 The Consultation Paper also sensibly suggested that commission members could 
nominate another individual to take their place. 
IX CONCLUSION 
The enactment of a supreme law Bill of Rights in New Zealand would enhance the importance 
of judicial independence and lead to increased scrutiny of the method of appointing judges. Canada's 
experience after enacting the Charter indicates that New Zealand's existing appointments system 
will need to be reformed as the present appointments process lacks transparency, operates via an 
exclusive and closed-off process, and gives wide discretion to the Attorney-General, whose integrity 
is the main safeguard against improperly political appointments.  
The latter parts of this article evaluated alternative methods of appointing judges. The Canadian 
case study suggests that any reform adopted must be proactive, codified, apolitical and responsive to 
the issues raised. Reform of judicial appointments should aim to increase public confidence in the 
independence and democratic legitimacy of the judiciary, provide safeguards to prevent improperly 
political appointments and, to reduce the risk of public attacks on the judiciary, enhance the 
perception that political appointments will not occur. 
The foregoing discussion showed that several of the criteria by which appointments systems 
were assessed are in tension, for example reform that enhances independence from the government 
inevitably reduces accountability to Parliament. As a result, no reform will attract universal support; 
the reform favoured depends to an extent on which values are prioritised over others. 
  
185  Ministry of Justice, above n 33, at [5]. See the discussion at [6]–[7] about proposed exceptions to this 
general process, for example for temporary appointment of former judges. 
186  For Supreme Court vacancies, a second Supreme Court judge, or another Judge who was not being 
considered for elevation to the Supreme Court, could sit on the Commission.  
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This article contends that the best option for reform is a judicial appointments commission in the 
form of a recommending body that supplies a shortlist of candidates to the Attorney-General. This 
creates a genuine check on the Attorney-General and, in doing so, enhances the perception that 
appointees are well-qualified and chosen based on merit. This perception will increase public 
confidence in the independence of the judiciary and help to protect judges from political attacks. 
The Attorney-General's retention of discretion and the involvement of MPs in the process enhances 
the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary, a particularly important feature given that judges would 
have the power to strike down laws passed by Parliament. 
Although the present system of appointing judges has operated effectively in the current context, 
it is insufficiently robust to withstand the additional pressure inevitably placed upon it if a supreme 
law Bill of Rights were enacted. Accordingly, the adoption of a supreme law Bill of Rights should 
be accompanied by the creation of a judicial appointments commission in New Zealand. 
 
 
